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Abstract: The political discussion to reduce the carbon footprint of Germany’s electricity sector,
focusing on coal, is intensifying. In this paper, we develop scenarios for phasing out lignite and hard
coal power plants in Germany prior to the end of their technical lifespan (“coal-exit”). Our analysis
bases upon two coal-exit instruments, the retirement of coal generation capacities and the limiting
of how much aged coal power plants with high carbon intensity can be used within a year. Results
show that phasing out coal in Germany would have a considerable impact on Central European
electricity markets, in terms of decarbonization efforts and electricity trade. An ambitious coal-exit
could avert foreseeable shortcomings in Germany’s climate performance in the short-run and release
additional carbon savings, thus compensating for potential shortfalls in other energy-intensive sectors
by 2030. Limited emissions in the range of 27% would be shifted to neighboring countries. However,
tremendous positive climate effects on European scale would result, because Germany’s annual
emission savings in 2030 would be substantial. Totaling 85 million tons of CO2, the overall net
reduction is equivalent to 17.5% of total European emissions in 2030 without retirements of coal-firing
power plants prior to the end of their technical lifespan.




Germany has not been particularly stringent with respect to reducing greenhouse gas emissions
in the 2010s. In fact, the initial goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2020 (basis: 1990)
will be missed by a wide margin (7%), neglecting possible short-term reductions as a consequence of
the coronavirus pandemic in 2020. Thus, efforts must be strengthened if the goal to cut emission by
55% by 2030 is to be met [1]. Since the signing of the Paris Agreement, however, pressure by political
actors, civil society and climate movements (e.g., Fridays for Future, Ende Gelände) has increased. As
part of its transformation to a low-carbon energy system, generally called “energiewende”, Germany
is therefore evaluating options to reduce its CO2 emissions from the coal sector, by far its largest single
emitter at about 250 Mt (2017). Germany hereby follows other European countries that have already
implemented policies to reduce their reliance on coal-fired electricity provision, or simply to define
concrete timetables for phasing out coal (“coal-exit”), including Denmark, France, the Netherlands,
and the UK.
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Coal, formerly the backbone of Germany’s economy since the second world war [2,3] is risking
to become the Achilles heel of its energy transition in the 21st century. Within this context also the
public perception of coal is undergoing a shift [4]. Rinscheid and Wüstenhagen find that a majority
of citizens would support a relatively rapid phase-out by 2025 [5]. In addition, coal regions are
putting pressure on the government asking for financial support to ease the upcoming transition
and related employment effects [6]. The resulting “Commission on Growth, Structural Change and
Employment”—often also referred to as “coal commission”—recommended a coal phase-out by
2035-2038 [7]. Appendix A provides further details on the German coal commission. This phase-out
schedule will be implemented within a coal phase-out law in late summer 2020. This outcome was
celebrated by some as a unique settlement between all involved actors and criticized heavily by others
stressing that an earlier phase-out by 2030 is required to meet Germany’s climate targets [8,9].
The German electricity system is strongly interconnected with the rest of the European system.
The planned coal phase-out, in addition to the closure of the remaining nuclear power plants (another
9.5 GW to be shut down by 2022), will therefore have strong effects on its neighboring countries, both
with respect to resource adequacy and also overall CO2 emissions. Germany is a large net exporter
of electricity (around 50 TWh in 2017, i.e., about 10% of its electricity generation) and a reduction
in its surplus might create shortages in other countries. An increase of (fossil-fuel based) electricity
production outside of Germany also might offset (parts of the) CO2 mitigation efforts within Germany—
being referred to as “waterbed effect”. Recent research as well as the recommendations of the coal
commission therefore emphasize that the reduction of CO2 emissions in Germany need to be taken out
of the ETS-market to safeguard the overall climate objectives [10].
In this paper, we develop scenarios for phasing out lignite and hard coal power plants in Germany,
then calculate the energy and climate effects on both the German and the European electricity systems,
with respect to trade flows, electricity mix and CO2 emissions. We are particularly interested in long-term
resource adequacy, i.e., the availability of sufficient generation capacity to meet demand, as well as
the overall CO2 emissions of the electricity system. We use an established, large-scale model called
dynELMOD (dynamic electricity model), a dynamic partial equilibrium model of the European electricity
system until 2050 posed as a linear optimization problem [11]. The model decides on cost-optimal
investment and dispatch for conventional and renewable power plants, storage systems, demand-side
management and high-voltage transmission lines.
1.2. Literature Review
While it is widely recognized that compliance with climate targets requires a phase-out coal, the
instruments to achieve this are subject to debate.
Heinrichs and Markewitz compare a German coal-phase out along a predetermined path with
other options to mitigate emissions [12]. To this end they apply a model of the entire energy system,
which optimizes investment decisions until 2050 under myopic foresight. The analysis is based on
three scenarios: In a reference scenario all coal-fired power plants run until the end of their technical
lifetime. In the second scenario, coal power plants with technical lifetimes exceeding 2040 are switched
off in 2040. In a third scenario, the same reduction of emissions as in the phase-out scenario has to be
achieved, but the model can endogenously decide on measures to do this. Overall, model results show
that the considered phase-out pathways result in a substantial reduction of emissions. However, as
a stand-alone policy measure, they are insufficient for complying with political targets of reducing
emission by 55% until 2030 and by 80% until 2050, compared to 1990 levels. This is mainly because
reductions are limited to the power sector. Compared to the reference scenario, some sectors even show
an increase in emissions. If the model is allowed to achieve the same amount of reduction freely, the
estimated costs of avoiding emissions are 10% smaller, mainly because less efficient lignite plants are
phased out preferably. Based on these model results, they conclude that an extension of the European
emission trading scheme could achieve the cost-efficient solution identified in the third scenario.
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Not extending, but complementing the European trading scheme with national measures of
carbon pricing to phase-out coal is something investigated by Wilson and Staffell [13]. They analyze
the impact of Great Britain’s carbon tax implemented as price floor complementary to the European
trading scheme. They find the tax induced a rapid fuel switch from coal to gas that decrease overall
emissions in Great Britain by 6%. However, they stress results cannot simply be transferred to other
countries. In Germany a rapid fuel switch seems possible and could achieve a similar reduction in
carbon emissions, because there is a sufficient amount of underutilized gas power-plants. However,
since the German electricity market is much more connected with neighboring countries, the risk of
carbon leakage increases.
Osorio et al. have a closer look on the effect a national carbon price floor for Germany has
on national and European emissions [14]. Their results highlight how much the interconnection of
European electricity markets affects the national climate policy: Depending on the power markets
developments and climate policies in other countries, the carbon price floor required for Germany to
meet its 2030 climate target ranges from 33 to 57 €/tCO2. The effect German reductions have on other
European countries is again highly dependent on how the European emission trading scheme will
develop. In the long run, German reductions could almost entirely be offset by additional emissions
from other countries due to the increase in emission allowances. Such an effect could be avoided if
Germany cancels emission certificates in addition to introducing a price floor.
1.3. Research Question and Summary Findings
This paper contributes to the literature on the low-carbon transformation by shedding light on the
effects of phasing out coal in Germany, within the European context. Unlike existing research, it focuses
on the power sector, where a coal phase-out has the greatest effect by far. This approach also allows for
capturing the effects of a German coal phase-out on power generation in other European countries.
More specifically, our research question is two-fold. First, what are the effects of a coal phase-out
in Germany in terms of generation patterns, installed capacity and future investments, and climate
performance on i) the German and ii) the European electricity market? The effects, in turn, would
need to be considered in the internal discussions of the phase-out in Germany, where the discussion is
becoming tenser as pressure to achieve greenhouse gas emission reductions is increasing.
Therefore, the present paper identifies possible pathways for the lignite and hard coal phase-out
in Germany within the context of the European electricity system. For each path, a model calculation
of the European electricity system analyzes the effect on carbon emissions and describes the resulting
mixture of generation technologies. Our findings show that a rapid coal phase-out in Germany leads to
a significant modification of generation patterns and trade flows between Germany and its neighbors.
The fears of a major transfer of coal emissions from Germany to other countries, however, can be
mitigated: As the German coal mix is by far the most CO2-intensive one, overall European emissions
are reduced significantly—by up to 85 Mt CO2 in 2030, amounting to 17.5% of total emissions in the
reference scenario—in the case of a German coal phase-out, as compared to no coal phase-out policies.
Interestingly, neither coal- nor nuclear-based electricity provision of the neighbors increases significantly:
Poland, the second largest coal country, is using its capacities broadly, and only increases its generation
using natural gas. Likewise, Germany’s western neighbors do not increase their nuclear electricity
generation as they are already running at full capacity. The model results emphasize that unilateral
decisions by one country, e.g., the coal phase-out in Germany, need to be analyzed, prepared and
executed with at least its neighbors, if not the entire European electricity system, in mind. Unilateral
capacity and system adequacy planning, sometimes still stipulated by domestic stakeholders, does not
make any sense in this context and the planning instrument of “national electricity balances” has been
rightfully abandoned in Germany (and at the European level) in order to support an overall European
low-carbon energy transformation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section describes the scenarios for
different speeds of the coal phase-out in Germany, provides a brief description of the model, and the
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data used. Section 3 presents the results with respect to the electricity mix, trade flows, and emissions,
both in Germany and in the larger European context. Section 4 discusses these results and places the
potential German phase-out in the European context.
2. Methodology: Scenario Development and Model Description
2.1. Scenarios for a German Coal Phase-Out
The present study analyzes implications of a coal phase-out in Germany on the emissions of
the electricity sector, electricity generation mixes and national electricity trade accounts in Germany
and on European electricity markets. The analysis was based upon a reference scenario and four
coal-exit pathways with shut downs of coal power plants before they reach their technical lifetime.
The reference scenario REF represents a business-as-usual continuation of German energy and
climate policy regulation dating to August 2018 and updates available power generation capacities
in Germany. Previously transferred back-up capacities, such as the capacity reserve (in German:
Sicherheitsbereitschaft) were considered. This reserve holds lignite power plants on stand-by and
gradually increases to a total of 2.7 GW as more power plants were transferred, beginning in 2016. After
four years on stand-by, the power plants are decommissioned, such that the Sicherheitsbereitschaft is
completely dispersed in 2023 [15]. Power plants are retired once they reach the end of their assumed
technical lifetime [11]. Without any additional political interventions considered, this would yield a
continuation of coal combustion beyond 2050. Retrofitting of power plants, one option to prolong their
technical lifetime, is not permitted. Our reference assumption framework foresees the phase-out of
lignite power plants by 2050, while hard coal power plants are shut down beyond 2050. The available
exogenous European-wide carbon budget is aligned with a linear decarbonization pathway envisaged
by the European Union mandating an overall reduction of 98% by 2050 [16]. Appendix B details
additional scenario assumptions.
Besides the reference scenario (REF), we modeled four coal-exit pathways for Germany: First, one
scenario using the capacities of the reference case with a limitation of the annual operation time of aged
coal power plants (REF-flh). Second, one phase-out scenario closing down coal power plants additional
to the reference scenario at a moderate rate (MODERATE). Third, one scenario using this moderate coal
exit schedule in conjunction with the aforementioned full-load hour (flh) reduction of aged coal power
plants remaining online (MODERATE-flh). Last, one scenario retiring coal power plants at a rapid
rate (RAPID). Table 1 illustrates installed hard-coal and lignite generation capacities available within
our scenarios over time. The capacities are derived from coal-exit schedules suggested by German
policy-makers, in conjunction with emissions performance standards implemented in other countries
that used to or still heavily rely on coal combustion. The MODERATE scenario was based on a coal-exit
proposal from German coalition talks in November 2017, which was favored by the parties CDU/CSU
and FDP. It foresees a reduction of coal-fired capacities of 5 GW by 2020, compared to the available
power plant stack in 2017. The capacity continuously decreases until 2030, representing a reduction of
70% of the available generation capacity in the reference scenario in 2020. Lignite capacities are initially
reduced, then completely removed from operation by 2030. In the same year, the phase-out of hard
coal power plants begins and is completed in 2040. Capacities of intermediate time steps were linearly
interpolated and adjusted to fit the actual available power plant stack. Additionally, the RAPID exit
constitutes a more stringent coal phase-out pathway: By 2020, the available coal generation capacity
in 2017 is reduced by 9 GW. By 2030, 18 GW are retired compared to the base case. In terms of total
available coal capacity, this scenario approximates the coal commission’s recommendation [7].
We investigated two different coal-exit policy instruments: First, a mandated retirement of
coal-fired power plants in the order of the aforementioned capacity reductions. This ‘command and
control’ approach is a common sectoral regulation, with the allocation directly determined by the
government [17]. Second, limiting the annual operating time of coal power plants that are than 20 years
online (by 2020). This is a soft phase-out policy measure and is held to be efficient in reducing emissions,
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while, at the same time, barely affecting the number of employees in the affected power plants [18,19].
Keeping coal power plants connected to the grid and limiting their operational hours to those with low
renewable intake (and consequently higher wholesale prices) secures grid stability while still enabling
profitability. The examined configuration restricts the annual operating time of coal-fired power plants
more than 20 years old to maximum of 4000 full load hours per year [20]. In other words, a power plant
of this age can generate on average at a load factor of 50%. This is similar to other implementations of
emissions performance standards in the UK, Canada, and select US states [21]. Another reason to limit
full load hours could be the implementation of the newest European environmental directive on the best
available techniques for large combustion plants (European Union’s Industrial Emissions Directive).
This directive takes effect in 2021 and includes stricter regulations on nitrogen oxide, sulphur dioxide,
and mercury emissions that are not met by most older coal fired plants in Germany [22]. The full load
hour (flh) reduction is applied to the base case (REF-flh) and the moderate pathway (MODERATE-flh).
Table 1. Hard coal and lignite capacities in the reference scenario REF and the investigated coal
phase-out pathways with or without full load hour restrictions. Note that the scenarios REF and
REF-flh, as well as the MODERATE and MODERATE-flh are based upon the same assumptions on
available hard-coal and lignite capacities, respectively (own calculations).
Scenario Technology 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
REF (flh) Hard coal 24.7 19.1 19.1 16.5 9.9 7.3 7.2 7.0
Lignite 21.0 18.2 17.6 10.2 9.3 9.0 5.6 0
MODERATE (flh) Hard coal 24.7 19.1 19.0 12.9 6.8 0 0 0
Lignite 21.0 13.2 3.6 0 0 0 0 0
RAPID Coal 24.7 19.1 14.8 8.6 3.1 0 0 0
Lignite 21.0 9.2 3.6 0 0 0 0 0
Germany is not the only country pondering a coal phase-out within Europe. Table 2 shows
assumed exogenous coal-exit pathways based upon the extensive database of the Europe Beyond Coal
initiative [23]. The implemented pathways are, wherever possible, aligned with concrete shut-down
dates of coal power plants announced by the respective governments or linearly interpolated and
adjusted to the capacity of available power plants. To fit the underlying model structure used in
this study, the exit dates were approximated to five-year increments. Furthermore, a moratorium on
capacity additions was imposed for countries that had announced a coal-exit. Note that, these coal-exit
schedules date to August 2018. Meanwhile, until the date of publication, there have been rapid changes
of coal-exit policies in some countries: The United Kingdom (UK) aims at completely phasing-out
coal by 2025, Austria (AT) by 2020 and Denmark (DK) by 2030. This yield a slight overestimation of
available coal capacities in Europe by our analysis.
Table 2. Assumed coal-exit dates for European countries (own calculations based on [23]).
Country AT BE DK FI FR IE IT NL PT SE UK
Phase-out year 2030 2020 2035 2030 2025 2030 2030 2030 2035 2025 2030
2.2. Model Description
We used the dynamic partial equilibrium model dynELMOD (dynamic electricity model) [11].
The model represents the European electricity system and was posed as a linear optimization problem.
The model determined the European mix of generation technologies and flexibility options consisting
of power plants using conventional and renewable energy sources, storage systems and demand-side
management facilities and their deployment. dynELMOD also output the expansion of interconnection
points for cross-border trade of electricity.
It based its decision on current data for the European power plant portfolio and uses the existing
electricity grid as a starting point. Additional inputs included forecasts on European electricity
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consumption, the costs and properties of the technologies under consideration, the historic, hourly
time series of electricity demand and feed-in of renewable energy from the base year, 2013. To deal
with the computational burden, these time series were reduced in a three-step procedure. First, starting
with the 7th hour, every 49th hour of the year was selected. Consequently, a new time-series of 179
representative periods was obtained. Next, the resulting time series were smoothed using a moving
average. Lastly, the reduced time-series was scaled to retain key properties of the original time-series
like minimum and maximum value or full load hours. A detailed description of the procedure could
be found in Gerbaulet and Lorenz in [11].
Using these reduced time-series, the model minimized the total system costs of providing electricity
by 2050 in five-year steps across 33 European countries divided into five synchronous grid zones (see
Figure 1). Afterwards results could be validated by running separate dispatch computations with the
full time-series for single years.
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Figure 1. Dynamic electricity model (dynELMOD) geographical coverage (Gerbaulet and Lorenz, 2017).
The key condition of the model is an extensive decarbonization of the European electricity supply
by 2050. In the model emissions can either be restricted by a yearly budget or a direct carbon price.
In case of a yearly budget, emissions can freely be distributed across all countries considered. As a
result, the shadow price on the carbon constraints can be interpreted as external carbon price required to
achieve the set emission budget under the assumption of complete markets. In this way, emission-driven
changes in utilization of thermal plants, like a fuel switch from coal to gas, are internalized via the
emission constraint as well. In the calculations presented in this paper, a European emission limit for the
power sector of 965.3 Mt CO2 equivalents in 2020 linearly decreasing to only 19 Mt CO2 equivalents in
2050 was used. Therefore, no direct carbon price was assumed, in order to not penalize emissions twice
at the same time. All countries were equally subject to the same emission constraints and investment
decisions were optimized based on these global conditions. Apart from binding coal (and nuclear)
phase-out plants, national goals of energy policy were not considered.
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3. Impacts of a Mandated German Coal Phase-Out on German and European Level
In this section, we presented and analyzed implications of a coal-exit on German and European
electricity generation, trade accounts and its contribution to greenhouse gas emission reduction.
3.1. Generation, Trade and Emissions in Germany
In the 2010s, a significant part of Germany’s domestically generated electricity was exported.
The net export surplus amounted to 53.7 TWh in 2016 [24]. Model results show that closing coal power
plants ahead of their technical lifetime was likely to consolidate the German trade balance, as illustrated
in Figure 2. In 2020 (Figure 2a), gross generation in Germany totals 669 TWh without additional energy
policies, with 95 TWh net exports. When limiting the annual operating time of older coal power plants
(REF-flh), total generation from coal power plants decreased by some 100 TWh, which was equally
shared between hard coal and lignite power plants. This was partially offset by a higher gas output
and strongly diminished net exports. The retirement of lignite-fired power plants in the MODERATE
and RAPID exit scenario yielded a reduction of lignite generation of 35 and 65 TWh, respectively. This
translated into a slight increase in gas generation and a significant decrease of net exports to neighboring
countries at just below the same amount. When limiting the annual operational time of aged coal
power plants, a fuel switch from coal to gas occurred. This is feasible, since, in the base case (REF),
low-cost coal-based electricity pushed more cost-intensive gas power pants out of market. This result
is in line with previous research [13]. For instance, in the MODERATE-flh scenario, lignite and hard
coal generation lowered by 67 and 56 TWh, respectively, which was partially compensated by a higher
output of otherwise idle gas-fired generation capacities in the order of 25 TWh. Similar fuel switches
were observable in other coal-reliant countries, such as the United Kingdom [13]. Additionally, German
electricity trade account consolidates as exports diminished by almost 100 TWh. The proportion of
variable renewable electricity generation from wind and photovoltaics in Germany will increase, as
assumed across all scenarios. Note that, due to our slight overestimation of available coal capacities in
AT, DK and the UK, gas generation and net exports in Germany might increase slightly, yet not to a
significant extent.
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Due to the age-based culling of plants, the complete phase-out of nuclear power, and the switching
off of coal-fired power plants in accordance with the phase-out paths, output from conventional
generation will continue to decline in Germany in 2030 (Figure 2b). While under the base case
assumptions Germany remains a net exporter of electricity, in all other investigated coal-exit pathways,
Germany becomes a net importer of electricity. The more ambitious the coal-exit, the greater Germany’s
net imports, totaling a maximum of 55 TWh. This equals the amount of net exports in 2016. Apart from
the REF-flh scenario, all lignite power plants were assumed to be retired by 2030. Besides triggering
higher net imports, gas and hard coal partially replace the eliminated lignite generation. The more
stringent the coal-exit, the less generation from hard coal. Besides these impacts on conventional
technologies, a coal-exit also facilitated the expansion of renewable energy sources: In any of the
investigated coal-exit scenarios generation from wind increases by 2.5 TWh, such that the proportion
of variable renewable electricity generation from wind and photovoltaics in Germany would increase
by 2030. Intriguingly, this proportion was equally distributed across all coal-exit scenarios. However,
net imports rose with the ambition level of the German coal-exit, which is further discussed in the next
chapter. Although differing significantly in 2020, results of the scenarios MODERATE-flh and RAPID
exit aligned closely in 2030. While in the former the reduction in generation from hard coal power
plants was 4.5 TWh higher than in the latter, the increase of imports was stronger by 4.1 TWh (changes
were compared to the base case, respectively). This finding revealed that, in terms of reduction of coal
generation, the limitation of the annual operation time in conjunction with the retirement of coal power
plants was more effective than the mere command and control approach, although this difference was
almost fully compensated by higher imports.
Figure 3 illustrates the capacity expansion pathways for Germany under the RAPID scenario
(due to our slight overestimation of available coal capacities in AT, DK and the UK the expansion of
renewable energy sources might increase slightly, yet not to a significant extent). Despite the retirement
of coal capacity, model results show no capacity additions in 2020. Considering the consolidating effect
on the German electricity trade account, this finding suggests that there were structural overcapacities
in the German electricity sector. In the short-run, these would be reduced by a German coal-exit.Energies 2020, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 20 
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In contrast, retiring coal capacities before they reach the end of their technical lifetime would affect
the cost-efficient mix of generation technologies in 2030. Instead of continued coal-based electricity,
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the energy system will expand toward renewable energy sources. Wind capacities are expanded by
additional 2.5 GW in 2030 in all coal-exit scenarios, while, compared to today’s available power plants
stack, none of the coal-exit pathways foresaw an expansion of thermal power plants. Consequently, the
ratio of variable renewable capacity to dispatchable conventional capacity increased. This incentivizes
the cost-optimal potential of load management. Except from the REF-flh scenario, the value of flexibility
in the electricity system to accommodate renewable energy rose, resulting in an expansion of facilities
that provided demand-side flexibility (demand-side management) by around 2 GW.
The model results show that a German coal-exit was an appropriate measure to decrease greenhouse
gases emitted by the German electricity sector (with biomass being perceived as carbon-neutral).
However, Figure 4 illustrates that not all investigated phase-out pathways were effective at meeting
Germany’s climate obligations (note that due to our slight overestimation of available coal capacities in
AT, DK and the UK the usage of gas-fired power plants in Germany might increase slightly, thus also
emissions, yet not to a significant extent). In fact, the sectoral 2020 target could only be achieved in the
MODERATE-flh scenario. In this case, a surpass of the carbon savings target in the electricity sector, at
just below 4 Mt CO2 equivalents, would be realized and could compensate for conceivable shortfalls in
other energy-intensive sectors, such as transport. The mere command and control approach, or the
reduction of full load hours only, will not suffice in the short-run; even though reducing full load hours
appears to be more efficient in terms of emission reductions. While there are substantial emission
reductions in either case, both the MODERATE and RAPID exit cases would miss the 2020 mark by
30% and 16%, respectively. Emission reductions in the REF-flh lag only 7.5%. behind. This finding
shows that, in the short run, aged coal-fired power plants are one major driver of German greenhouse
gas emissions and that limiting their operations is an efficient means to achieve carbon savings.
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In the beginning of the middle of March 2020, societal and economic restrictions were imposed by
the German government to limit the spread of the corona virus COVID-19. Economic sectors suffering
from these restrictions are numerous: exhibitions, hotel industry, retail sector, manufacturing industries
and airlines, just to name a few. Consequently, the economic activity in Germany partially came to a
halt, significantly reducing electricity demand from affected sectors, thus also electricity provision
from fossil fuels. Foreseeable short-terms effects in terms of Germany’s climate performance amount to
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additional carbon savings of 5 Mt CO2 equivalents for the period between mid of March to mid of April
2020 [25]. Long-term effects are highly uncertain as they strongly hinge upon the time it takes until the
coronavirus is under control, such that the restrictions can be eased and a resumption of economic
activity becomes possible. Additionally, it remains uncertain whether there will be a persistent level
shift of electricity demand due to economic effects, or whether it will rise up to pre-COVID-19 levels,
or perhaps even beyond due to economic catch-up effects. Initial projections of potential additional
carbon savings range from 15 to 35 Mt CO2 equivalents in 2020 (note that the figures for carbon savings
due to the economic effects of COVID-19 are not a result of our model-based analysis, but are estimates
detailed in [25]).
Based on the German climate action plan, the admissible sectoral emission budget for 2030 totals 141
Mt CO2 equivalents; in Figure 5, the dashed line marks this. Difficulties arising in the decarbonization
of other carbon- and energy-intensive sectors could yield tremendous reduction deficits in the German
emission account. For example, current forecasts predict a short fall of 40–50 Mt of CO2 equivalents
by 2030 in the transport sector [26]. For the sake of illustration of sector target flexibility, Figure 5
displays conditions surrounding an 80% emission reduction in the electricity generation, with the
admissible budget totaling 72 Mt CO2 equivalents. The resulting “flexibility corridor” represents
emission reductions between 61% and 80% in the electricity sector. Similar to 2020, Germany’s 2030
target can only be reached by intensifying the coal phase-out. Without any additional energy and
environmental or climate policies, it will be missed by about 80 Mt CO2 equivalents, which is more
than half of the available carbon budget. An ambitious energy policy could realize extensive emission
reductions and put Germany on track to achieving its climate targets. Although there would be a slight
increase in emissions from gas- and waste-fueled generation in the order of in the order of in total 4.6 Mt
CO2 equivalents, the overall net reduction effect is positive: carbon savings could surpass the 2030 target
by approximately 25% or 35 Mt CO2 equivalents in the most stringent coal-exit scenarios. Notably, this
holds true for both the moderate exit under full load hour restriction (MODERATE-flh) and the mere
retirements in the RAPID exit. If lignite power plants were completely phased out, along with some hard
coal plants retired (MODERATE), the objective will be exceeded by 10 Mt CO2 equivalents. The German
climate targets, however, will have to be adjusted due to the planned increase of the European climate
target of −40% to −50%–55% by 2030 (compared to 1990) [27,28]. It is to be expected that the moderate
exit (MODERATE) would in that case not meet these more stringent targets. The limitation of the
operational full load hours only is not even sufficient for meeting Germany’s current 2030 climate
targets. Note that, due to our slight underestimation of available coal-based generation capacities in
AT, DK and the UK, the usage of gas-fired power plants in Germany might increase slightly, thus also
emissions, yet not to a significant extent.
The greenhouse gas effect is a stock-flow problem, requiring a budgetary approach. That is, the
total stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is driving the effect, not the annual flow into the
atmosphere. Potential carbon savings beyond the sector’s target could offset excess emissions from
earlier years 2010–2020. If, contrary to expectations, Germany’s electricity sector also manages to
comply with its climate targets in the short-run, a more stringent coal-exit coal could compensate for a
lack of emission reductions in other sectors, providing flexibility for Germany’s overall decarbonization
at high cost efficiency. This implies that, in the medium-run, phasing out carbon-intensive lignite
power plants could pave the way for compliance with Germany’s climate policy targets.
Over the entire modeling horizon (2020–2050), the overall German emission reduction was
tremendous, compared to total emissions in the baseline (REF). It ranged from 330 Mt CO2 equivalents,
or 29%, in the case of the REF-flh scenario, to more than 460 Mt CO2 equivalents in both the
MODERATE-flh and the RAPID scenario, equivalent to over 40% of total emissions in Germany during
the period 2020–2050.
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3.2. Generation, Trade and Emissions in Europe
As previously mentioned, a substantial part of Germany’s electricity is exported. Domestic power
plants in purchasing countries, generating at higher variable cost than the price of the imported electricity,
are pushed out of market by Germany’s excess generation according to the merit-order principle and
remain idle. However, such imports are only economically viable if the imported electricity cannot be
generated domestically at a lower cost. This is why German exports do not compete with domestic
nuclear or lignite power plants located in importing countries, which are very likely to have lower
variable cost than price of the imported electricity from Germany, thus being cost-competitive relative
to German coal-fired power plants. Instead, German exports primarily displace lower-emission power
plants (both domestically and abroad), such as gas [29]. Figure 6 illustrates the shift in generation within
and outside Germany that would follow a decline in German coal-fired generation in 2020 (Figure 6a)
and 2030 (Figure 6b). Figure 7 shows the corresponding shift in trade patterns of Germany and its
neighbors, likewise in comparison to the base case (REF) in 2020 (Figure 7a) and 2030 (Figure 7b). Three
effects become apparent: First, across all coal-exit scenarios there is a fuel switch from high-emission coal
generation to technologies incurring lower or zero emissions (see Figure 6). Idle (and new) capacities
entering the market are mainly gas power plants that otherwise would have remained pushed out
of market both within and outside Germany, enabling higher net imports in Germany. Note that we
conservatively accounted for direct emissions from the provision of electricity, that is, emissions from the
combustion of conventional natural gas. Due to our slight overestimation of available coal capacities in
AT, DK and the UK, the decrease of coal-based generation would decrease slightly, while gas generation
would increase to a similar extent. The overall dynamics illustrated here, however, remain the same.
Second, reduced German coal generation lowers German exports significantly in both 2020 and
2030 (see Figure 7a,b), as discussed in Section 3.1. This allows for increased electricity generation of
otherwise idle and new capacities outside and within Germany generating at higher marginal cost as
well as exports of neighboring countries. The amplitude of this effect is strongly correlated with the
extent of the reduction of generation of coal power plants in Germany. In 2020, the effect primarily
occurred under full load restriction of aged German coal power plants. This is plausible, as in the
command and control approach, power plants with a capacity of only 5 (MODERATE) or 9 (RAPID)
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GW were assumed to leave the market. All remaining power plants could be operated consistently at
an unchanged high capacity factor throughout the year. However, in 2030 the command and control
approach appeared to be more effective in consolidating Germany’s trade account than the limitation
of the annual operational time of aged power plants alone. Many of the restricted aged power plants
dispatching in 2020 would have reached the end of their technical lifetime by 2030. Thus, retiring the
latest coal power plants vintage would exert a stronger influence on Germany’s, as well as its neighbor’s,
generation and net exports. Due to our slight overestimation of available coal capacities in AT, DK and
the UK, the export capacities of these countries might slightly decrease, such that their trade accounts
would decrease to a similar extent. The overall dynamics illustrated here, however, remain the same.
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Third, there is an extra incentive for expanding renewable energy because the option of cheap
imported German coal-fired electricity would no longer be available, thus a German coal-exit enhances
European decarbonization by advancing renewable energy sources. In 2020, this is primarily onshore
wind in Denmark and Norway, which due to underlying spatially differentiated feed-in characteristics
have a comparative cost advantage over Germany. In 2030 this is both solar PV primarily in Italy and
wind primarily in the Nordic countries, which, again benefit from beneficial feed-in characteristics
compared to Germany (see Figure 6b). Gerbaulet and Lorenz in [11] elaborate on this effect. Concerns
regarding a German coal phase-out shifting electricity generation to other controversial technologies in
neighboring countries—such as French nuclear power or Polish lignite—are unfounded. In fact, nuclear
power plants in France already run at full capacity. Our model results show that, in the short-run, there
was hardly any change in the French energy mix, with minor gas capacity additions of about 500 MW.
In 2030, the expansion of wind power on the order of four to five GW was incentivized. Concomitant,
to accommodate the increasing variability induced by these variable generation technology, additional
storage facilities holding about two GW were likely to be built. As the capacity factor of the French
nuclear power plant fleet remained unchanged, slightly increasing French exports were driven by
higher wind output. The same held true for Polish lignite and hard coal power plants, which, at
almost 30 GW capacity, represented around half of the coal capacity in Eastern Europe. Due to their
economic advantage over other technologies, like gas and imported electricity from Germany, they
ran at full capacity in any considered scenario. In contrast, in the short-run, idle gas power plants
switched online, which is in line with previous research [13]. Ten years after, additional investments
in 1–3 GW of gas capacity were incentivized by a German coal-exit, presumably slightly increasing
Polish net exports. Intriguingly, a more ambitious German coal-exit rather incentivized gas capacity
additions, not wind. This effect is plausible for two reasons: First, coal combustion provides more
than 70% of today’s electricity in Poland. The majority of Polish coal power plants are older than 30
years, i.e., by 2030 older than 40 years [23], calling for replacement with a dispatchable technology.
Second, decommissioned dispatchable coal capacity in Germany is partially replaced with low-carbon
dispatchable gas power plants outside of Germany. Further additional gas capacity additions are
likely to occur in the Netherlands and Belgium at the order of 2–3 GW between 2020 and 2030, which
dispatch at times with low renewable energy sources availability. On a European level, our model
results show that a German coal-exit would advance renewable energy sources. In 2030, additions
across Europe total 15–20 GW of Solar PV, 8–10 GW wind and, concomitant, 5–6 GW of storage.
Germany, the largest European economy, is the main polluter within Europe. In 2017, Germany
emitted 936 Mt CO2 equivalents, over 20% of European’s overall emissions [30]. Our model results
show that, without any additional policy measures, emissions from Germany’s electricity sector will
be higher than the emissions of Germany’s neighboring countries electricity provision altogether in
2020 and 2030. This stresses the relevance of decarbonizing the German electricity sector. Figure 8
shows the effect on emissions from the power sector on Europe relative to the base case scenario
(REF), differentiated by fuel type (due to our slight overestimation of available coal capacities in AT,
DK and the UK emissions from coal-based generation in these countries might marginally decrease,
compensated partially by higher emissions from gas generation. Yet, these changes do not change
the overall dynamics illustrated here). Across all coal-exit scenarios, there is fuel switch effect from
coal to gas in Germany and other European countries in both 2020 (Figure 8a) and 2030 (Figure 8b).
Carbon savings associated with a German coal-exit by far outweigh additional emissions from power
plants—mostly gas—that partially compensate for decommissioned coal generation. This principally
occurs in Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Poland. Consequently, following dynELMOD’s
determination of the most cost-efficient power plant portfolio, a German coal-exit could tremendously
benefit Europe’s decarbonization, potentially contributing to achieving Europe’s climate targets.
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and 2030 (b). The figures below the bars indicate net change in emi sions (own calculations).
In the short-term, the strongest net reduction of almost 80 Mt CO2 equivalents could be realized
by both imposing a limit on the full load hours of aged power plants and retiring lignite power plants.
More precisely, due to the fuel switch, emissions from the power sector outside Germany rose by
29 Mt CO2 equivalents, yet were overcompensated by the 107 Mt CO2 equivalents of carbon savings
within Germany. Considering the instruments separately, the limitation of the annual operating time
appeared to incentivize a stronger fuel switch, going from coal to gas, with a stronger net effect on
European emissions than the command and control approach: the carbon savings totaled 7% and 8% in
the REF-flh and MODERATE-flh scenarios, respectively. In the MODERATE and RAPID exit scenarios,
savings of 3% and 6% could be achieved.
In 2030, a German coal-exit could even yield stronger reductions, with the following simple relation:
The more ambitious the coal-exit, the greater the achieved carbon savings. Both the moderate exit under
full load hour restriction (MODERATE-flh) and the RAPID exit pathway could yield emission reductions
on the order of 85 Mt CO2 equivalents, which equaled a total reduction of European emissions in the
power sector of 17.5%. To provide further perspective, 85 Mt CO2 equivalents equaled Austria’s entire
emissions in 2017 [30]. In both scenarios, additional emissions due to displaced generation outside
Germany amounted to approximately 30 Mt CO2 equivalents. However, as these displaced additional
emissions were more than recovered by about 115 Mt CO2 equivalents savings within Germany there
was a positive net effect for all of Europe. In general, emission transfers did not exceed 7% of the
total emissions coming from power provision in Europe; again, being tremendously overcompensated
by German savings across all investigated scenarios. In Germany, the greater part of the emission
reductions was due to the completed phase-out of lignite. The same holds true at the European level, as
the lion’s share of generation from conventional energy sources was reduced in Germany.
For the entire optimization period (2020–2050), the overall net climate impact was immense in
all coal-exit scenarios. Compared to total emissions in the baseline (REF), it ranged from 193 Mt CO2
equivalents in the MODERATE scenario to more than 267 Mt CO2 equivalents in the most ambitious
scenarios MODERATE-flh and RAPID. The latter was equivalent to an overall European decrease of
roughly 9% compared to the baseline during the period 2020–2050.
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3.3. Parity Burden Sharing of the Coal-Exit within Germany
While both hard coal and lignite power plants are situated in Western Germany, only lignite
is used in Eastern Germany [31]. Given the low level of industrialization in Eastern Germany,
compared to Western Germany, the initial phase-out of lignite might involve social considerations [4,32].
Thus, we also modeled parity burden sharing between the hard coal and lignite industries for the
moderate pathway, with and without the full load hour restrictions (MODERATE and MODERATE-flh).
The reduction of five GW by 2020 and 14 GW in 2030 compared to the base line was equally distributed
between hard coal and lignite capacities. Likewise, any negative social impact was skewed away
from the Eastern-German coal regions Lusatia and the coal district in central Germany (Saxony and
Saxony-Anhalt) toward North Rhine-Westphalia, which is said to be socially more resilient to industry
closures [33].
Results show that, in both 2020 and 2030, carbon savings within Germany were two Mt CO2
equivalents lower than in the unmodified moderate pathway, with or without limits placed on the
operational time of aged power plants. This is because lignite power plants have a higher carbon-intensity
than hard coal power plants. Similarly, total generation from coal remained nearly unchanged, although
the ratio of lignite to hard coal increased. In terms of trade displacement, there were no significant
differences to the original moderate pathway. On the European level, total emissions slightly increased
in response to German decisions.
4. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Without phasing out coal in Germany, the country will neither meet its climate targets nor be
successful at making its envisioned conversion to an electricity and energy system based on renewable
energy. Therefore, this paper investigated two different tools to drive down German emissions from
the electricity sector within the context of current German and European climate policy: Either by the
mere retirement of coal power plants or the limitation of the operational time of older power plants
that, due to their technology vintage and lower efficiency, tend to be more carbon-intensive. Different
reduction pathways were modeled, visualizing the impact of a German coal-exit on carbon emissions,
power plant capacities and trade flows across the European electricity market.
The calculations show that an adequate contribution to Germany´s 2020 climate targets could only
be achieved by imposing limits on the annual operating of coal plants. Furthermore, coal phase-out
pathways in line with the coal commission’s recommendation enable achieving the current 2030 climate
targets in the energy sector in Germany. The German climate targets, however, will have to be adjusted
due to the planned increase of the European climate target of −40% to −50–55% by 2030 (compared to
1990). Additionally, additional CO2 reduction is needed to compensate missed targets of the past (and
most likely also 2020) as limiting global warming is dependent on the overall emitted CO2. Therefore,
exceeding the existing 2030 emission target should be targeted. Furthermore, this can compensate for
missed targets in other sectors.
Replacing overall capacities of 45 GW of (formerly baseload) coal capacity with mostly fluctuating
renewable energy sources over a twenty-year span imposes a major change on the existing German
electricity system. Enhancing further flexibility options, e.g., storage and demand-side-management, is
essential for enabling this decarbonization. Limiting annual operating time of old coal plants can help
to bridge this transformation period reaching, bringing about substantial emission reductions while
preserving flexible capacity. Running coal plants with lower capacity factors or as reserve units creates
additional employment needs, softening the effects of regional coal phase-outs. Additionally, shifting
coal closures within Germany between hard coal and lignite units or within lignite basins affected
regional employment figures but only minimally influenced overall European CO2 mitigation effects.
In contrast to frequently expressed concerns, the German CO2 mitigation effect will not be offset
by additional emissions in other European countries. On the contrary, our model results indicate that
phasing out coal before coal power plants reach the end of their technical lifetime would incentivize
overall European energy system decarbonization. In total, a German coal phase-out would reduce
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carbon emissions in Europe by up to 85 Mt in 2030. Following the recommendations of the German
coal commission, these additionally saved and not needed CO2 certificates would not be released
into the ETS market, therefore guaranteeing an overall emission reduction. While the electricity trade
balance of Germany might shift to becoming a net importer in some scenarios within the decade, it is
likely to consolidate in the medium-run.
In order to achieve German climate targets, policy makers should seek a mandated coal phase-out
in line with international climate targets. It would be economically beneficial to phase out coal-based
electricity provision due to the high negative externalities associated with coal mining and electricity.
Reducing full load hours, as shown within this paper, is an appropriate approach to achieve climate
targets with relatively few negative effects on employment and system stability. The recommendations
of the coal commission provide some valuable inputs that need implementation. The government
should mandate a coal-exit accompanied by a more stringent conversion of the electricity system to
accommodate renewable energy sources beyond the current expansion pathways of the Renewable
Energy Sources Act [34]. It also will be necessary to include storage, potential demand-side management
and intensified European integration in the considerations. It is only if Germany manages to phase out
coal that it can recover its lost position as a climate and energy policy leader within the European Union.
We limit our analysis to the decarbonization of the European electricity sector, assuming additional
electricity demand from the heat and transport sector. More differentiated sensitivity analysis of
different speed of such sector coupling effects should be conducted in future studies. Finally, the
applied time series reduction approach risks underrepresenting the extremes and the security of supply
considerations; as such, it should be a matter of future research.
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Appendix A –The German Coal Commission and Implemented Phase-Out Pathways
The commission consisted of four chairs and 24 representatives of industry, labor unions,
environmental NGOs, climate scientists and the regions. Around one-third of the commission’s
members can be grouped into a “pro coal” alliance, consisting of the trade union, industry and
local representatives of the lignite regions; their priority is to secure sufficient funds for the ongoing
structural change. Another third forms a “pro climate” alliance of NGOs, climate scientists and local
representatives pushing for a rapid coal phase-out. During the first meetings, external experts were
invited to provide inputs on various topics to allow for a sufficiently fact-based decision-making
process. Thereby, critics note that the choice of experts not only lacked any representatives of other
countries affected by climate change and younger generations, but also comprised less than 10%
women. Additionally, the government refrained from setting clear guidelines for the commission’s
work, which might have eased consensus talks, e.g., through setting an indisputable CO2 budget for
the coal sector. The recommendations from the commission were handed to the German government
at the end of January 2019. Following this, the government started discussions internally and with
affected stakeholders, exploring various options to implement the recommendations. However, as of
August 2019, no legal agreement has yet been reached regarding the concrete phase-out instrument or
the resulting pathways for hard coal and lignite power plants.
Our modeled scenarios assume the lignite phase-out occurring before the hard coal phase-out for
a number of reasons: First, lignite is the most carbon-intensive primary energy carrier; thus, it releases
more greenhouse gases than hard coal when combusted. Second, while many firms operate hard coal
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power plants in Germany, there are only two major players in the lignite industry (RWE AG and EPH
Holding), rendering the implementation of a phase-out agreement possible at an earlier stage than one
for hard coal. Finally, hard coal power plants are rather integrated, not only into power, but also heat
and industrial, provision. Decarbonizing the heat and industry sector might require hard coal power
plants to remain online for more years compared to lignite units.
Appendix B −Additional Scenario Assumptions
The scenarios are benchmarked against Germany’s climate targets for 2020, 2030 and 2050. As we
seek to investigate ways that Germany can achieve its emission reduction targets in the near future
and since the decarbonization of the heating sector is expected to be more difficult than the electricity
sector [35], we assume that the energy sector’s emission reductions must be fully realized within the
electricity sector. Since there are no sector targets for 2020 in Germany, we impose a 40 percent emission
reduction target for the electricity sector, which equals Germany’s overall greenhouse gas emission
target [36]. The energy sector’s emissions in 1990 totaled 466 Mt CO2 equivalents, with 382 Mt CO2
equivalents from power provision (own calculations based on [37,38]). A small proportion of the
greenhouse gases emitted by small distributed resources that cannot be attributed to a specific source,
thus being assigned to “others” are estimated to be on the order of 20 Mt CO2 equivalents in 2016 [37].
This proportion cannot be represented in the model, hence entering it exogenously, extrapolated to
2020 (12 Mt CO2) and 2030 (8 Mt CO2) according to the German government’s reduction targets.
The maximum emissions, in line with the 2020 target, were bounded by 217 Mt CO2 equivalents.
The 2030 targets are specified in the climate protection plan for 2050 [39]. While the plan stipulates
minimum greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for each energy-intensive sector—that is, energy,
buildings, industry, transport and agriculture—it does not explicitly differentiate between emissions
from the provision of electricity and heat by the energy sector. On the contrary, both electricity and
heat supply are treated as a whole and subsumed under one energy sector. The energy sector’s
minimum target is a 61 percent emission reduction compared to its emission level in the base year
1990, yielding a limit of greenhouse gases emitted by power sector of 141 Mt CO2 equivalents in 2030.
The 2050 targets are aligned with the decarbonization pathway envisaged by the European Union that
mandates an overall reduction of 98% by 2050 (see Scenario: “Diversified supply scenario” in Annex 1
Scenarios—assumptions and results page 70; row Power generation/District heating in [16]). For each
modeled year, an exogenous emission budget in line with the 98% emission reduction target laid out
by the European Commission [16] is implemented. Noteworthy, biomass is regarded as carbon-neutral.
Renewable expansion is aligned with the Renewable Energy Sources Act and the current coalition
contract of the federal government, which stipulate a share of the German electricity consumption
generated by renewable energy sources of 45% by 2025 and 65% by 2030 [34,39]. Finally, the Belgian
nuclear power plant fleet is prone to malfunctions and is frequently unavailable; thus, we assume the
remaining plants Doel and Tihange will be decommissioned by 2020.
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